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 “Do you know, Alyosha—don’t laugh! I composed a poem about a year ago. . . . Shall I tell 
it to you?”1 This poem, written by Dostoevsky’s eloquent and conflicted Ivan Karamazov, marks 
an open rebellion against Christianity, and against the Christian God, and has been hailed as one 
of the strongest possible arguments in favor of atheism. 2  Hidden within this critique of 
Christianity, there is another critique, a subtler critique, that could well take aim at one of the 
philosophical giants of the eighteenth century: Immanuel Kant. 
 Dostoevsky was not a Kant scholar, and The Brother’s Karamazov does not refer to Kant 
directly. Nevertheless, Kant’s ideas were a strong part of the greater intellectual climate of 
Dostoevsky’s time, and most scholars agree that not only did Dostoevsky have direct access to 
Kant’s work, but that Kant’s work seemed to have impacted his own, to at least some extent.3 
This link between Dostoevsky and Kant has received increasing attention over the past ten years, 
but one particular aspect of the link has, thus far, remained unnoticed. In his essays “Conjectural 
Beginning of Human History” and “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of 
View,” Kant argues that social antagonism, and any human suffering brought about by such 
antagonism, is justified by the role social antagonism plays in the development of humanity. In 
contrast, during his rebellion, Ivan Karamazov directly argues against this kind of theory, 
indirectly placing himself in opposition to Kant’s philosophy. This paper seeks to explore the 
connection between the ideas of the two thinkers—Kant and Karamazov—and argues that while 
Kant’s theory reveals that Karamazov’s argument is logically contradictory, Karamazov’s 
argument reveals that Kant’s theory might be morally flawed. 
Kant’s theory of social antagonism begins with human nature, and its inextricable link to 
rationality. In “Idea for a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” Kant writes 
that nature has given the human being the capacity to reason, and that of all the creatures 
populating the earth, this capacity is found exclusively in the human being.4 What makes the 
human being a human being, what makes the human being distinct from all other earthly 
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 creatures, is this rational capacity.5 Kant defines reason “in a creature” as “a faculty of widening 
the rules and purposes of the use of all its powers far beyond natural instinct.”6 The human being 
becomes the human being, the human being distinguishes herself as a human being, when she7 
uses the powers that have naturally been given to her in a way that is not dictated to her by her 
natural instinct.8 
In the “Conjectural Beginning of Human History,” Kant uses the biblical story of the 
temptation of Adam and Eve to better explain the idea of the use of reason as a break from 
natural instinct. In the beginning, writes Kant, humanity existed as did all other earthly beings, 
and was “guided by [natural] instinct alone.” 9  Through the sense of smell, and its strong 
connection to the sense of taste and the process of digestion, natural instinct dictated that some 
foods were suitable for consumption, and others were not.10 “But soon reason began to stir.”11 
There was one particular fruit that caught the attention of the early human beings. This fruit was 
forbidden by natural instinct, but the humans had other indicators that the fruit might be good for 
consumption.12 Perhaps the fruit “tempted because of its similarity to tasty fruits of which man 
had already partaken.”13  Or “there may have been the example of an animal which consumed it 
because, for it, it was naturally fit for consumption.”14 Whatever the reasons, the early humans 
decided to eat the fruit, and they decided to eat the fruit regardless of the dictates of natural 
instinct. 15  The early humans did “violence to the voice of nature, and its protests not 
withstanding . . . [made] the first attempt at a free choice.”16 
Unfortunately, this first attempt at a free choice did not have positive results.17 Human beings 
have since learned that it is unwise to eat fruits that are not naturally suited to the human 
constitution. All negative outcomes aside though, Kant’s point with this example is to illustrate 
the first human break with nature. The early humans made a choice based on something other 
than natural instinct. They appealed to a power that went beyond the boundaries established by 
natural instinct, and in so doing, they first exercised their capacity to reason.18  
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 Once the early humans made the first free choice and actualized their rational capacity, “it 
was impossible for [them] to return to the state of servitude (i.e., subjection to instinct).”19 
Instead, they continued to develop their rational abilities.20 They clothed themselves, thereby 
concealing the immediate object of sexual desire, and making possible a relationship between 
them that went beyond mere physicality.21 They began to anticipate the future, which “enable[d] 
[them] to prepare [themselves] for distant aims,” but also inspired them to worry about the 
troubles that coming events would bring to them, and in particular, to worry about that which 
“inexorably strikes all animals without, however, causing them care, namely, death.”22 Finally, 
they began to use animals for their own benefit, clothing themselves in animal skins.23 Kant 
argues that through this last step, the human being “came to understand, however obscurely, that 
he is the true end of nature, and that nothing that lives on earth can compete with him in this 
regard.”24 Through the use of her reason, the human being distinguished herself from the animal 
kingdom, and established herself as uniquely human. 
Kant holds that “All natural capacities of a creature are destined to evolve completely to their 
natural end.”25 The human being is no exception. As with all other earthly creatures, the human 
being’s capacities are meant to reach their perfect manifestation.26 For Kant, the human being 
“was not to be guided by instinct, not nurtured and instructed with ready-made knowledge; 
rather, he should bring forth everything out of his own resources.”27 The human being, and the 
human being alone, must be responsible for the development of the human race.28 This implies 
two things. First, the human race must begin in a primal state, in a state of underdevelopment, so 
that the human being can bring the human race into a developed state. Second, it is the activity of 
the human being herself that must develop the human race.29 The human being must struggle to 
find her own way to perfection.  
A potential problem with this process is the possibility that the human being will choose not 
to develop herself. If human development is to be carried out exclusively through human 
activity, then if the human being does not perform this activity, human development will not 
occur. If human development is to occur, and if human capacities are to reach a state of 
completion as nature intends, then the human being must be motivated to engage in activity that 
will further the development of human capacities. Moreover, as the development of human 
capacities must be the work solely of the human being, the motivation to develop these capacities 
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 cannot come from a force or impetus outside of the human being. The motivation to develop the 
capacities of the human being must come from inside of the human being herself. 
Kant solves this problem by appealing to the idea of social antagonism. He argues that within 
every human being there resides “the unsocial characteristic of wishing to have everything go 
according to his own wish.”30 When the human being enters into society with other human 
beings, this is bound to result in conflict. If what the human being wants for herself conflicts 
with what society itself wants, then the human being may find herself in a position of opposition 
to society.31 But this opposition ultimately turns out to be a good thing: “this opposition it is 
which awakens all his powers, brings him to conquer his inclination to laziness and . . . to 
achieve a rank among his fellows.”32 It is usually the most powerful members in any society that 
achieve what they want. If the human being makes herself into a powerful member of society, 
then her chances of overcoming the opposition of the other members of society and fulfilling her 
wishes increases dramatically. The social opposition the human being faces inspires her to 
develop her own capacities so that she can achieve her desires.   
Social antagonism also serves another very important function. It requires that human beings 
form an agreement with each other, a law or a constitution, that protects both the rule of society 
and the freedom of the individual.33 Social antagonism inspires the creation of “a perfectly just 
civic constitution,” or of the commonwealth. 34  It is in the commonwealth that the natural 
capacities of the human being reach their highest development. In Kant’s own words, “all 
culture, art which adorns mankind, and the finest social order” are born from this constitution.35  
This lawful civic constitution holds a significant place in Kant’s theory because of its ability 
to balance the interests of various individual human beings. One of the difficulties with social 
antagonism is that it can lead to the domination of one particular human being, or group of 
human beings, and the repression of all other human beings. When this happens, the natural 
capacities of the dominant human being(s) may be developed, but the natural capacities of all 
other human beings will remain untouched. The capacity of the human being might progress in a 
limited number of cases, but human capacities as a whole will make no progress. Yet Kant is 
clear that it is as a whole that the human race moves toward its perfection, writing, “in man . . . 
those natural capacities which are directed to the use of his reason are to be fully developed only 
in the race, not in the individual.”36 The uniquely human capacity, reason, is the kind of capacity 
that “requires trial, practice, and instruction in order gradually to progress from one level of 
insight to another.”37 Given the limited span of the human lifetime, if genuine human progress is 
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 to be made, it must happen by being passed along from human being to human being.38 The 
development of only a few human beings simply will not suffice.  
By protecting the freedom of all human beings, the lawful civic constitution ensures that all 
human beings are given the chance to develop their capacities, and that the human race as a 
whole can progress forward. 39  At the same time, by retaining some amount of opposition 
between human beings, the lawful civic constitution ensures that the motivation for human 
development remains very present within human society.40 “Such a society is one in which there 
is mutual opposition among the members, together with the most exact definition of freedom and 
fixing of its limits so that it may be consistent with the freedom of others.”41 Under the reign of 
the lawful civic constitution, all human beings are motivated to develop their capacities, and all 
are given the possibility to do so. 
Social antagonism, then, plays a crucial role in the development of the human being. It not 
only inspires the human being to develop her capacities, it also inspires her to create a state in 
which she and all other human beings are free to develop their capacities, and through which the 
human race can progress as a whole. Without social antagonism, it is unlikely that any such 
development would take place. 42  Kant writes that “without those in themselves unamiable 
characteristics of unsociability from whence opposition springs . . . all talents would remain 
hidden, unborn in an Arcadian shepherd’s life, with all its concord, contentment, and mutual 
affection.”43 In this case, the human being would be little higher than the sheep that she herds. 
Without social antagonism, the human being would be unmotivated to develop her natural 
capacities, and the human race would be unable to perfect itself.44 Social antagonism makes it 
possible for the human being to progress into the highest manifestation of humanity.45  
Kant sees this as reason enough to praise the existence of social antagonism. He 
enthusiastically proclaims: “thanks be to Nature, then, for the incompatibility, for the heartless 
competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess and to rule! Without them, all the 
excellent natural capacities of humanity would forever sleep, undeveloped.” 46 It is true that 
because of the length of time required to perfectly develop the natural human capacities, most 
human beings will never see the ideal manifestation of those capacities.47 Rather, most human 
beings will be stuck in the misery caused by social antagonism.48 The individual must suffer the 
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 negative consequences required in order for the human race to progress forward.49 Kant does not 
see a problem with this. Perhaps as an individual, the human being has reason to mourn, but 
“insofar as he is a member of a whole (a species), he must admire and praise the wisdom and 
purposiveness of the whole arrangement.” 50 The end result of social antagonism makes any 
suffering the individual must bear worthwhile.51 
It is this type of argument that Ivan Karamazov explicitly rejects. In the fifth book of 
Dostoevsky’s masterpiece, Karamazov presents an argument that in many ways bears a 
remarkable similarity to Kant’s discussion of social antagonism. Karamazov begins by 
describing a number of cases of extraordinary cruelty—particularly towards children—that he 
has taken from various newspapers.52 He speaks of a “well-educated, cultured gentleman and his 
wife” who beat their seven-year-old daughter with a “birch rod” that was “covered in twigs,” and 
when called to account in a court of law, justified their behavior by arguing that beating one’s 
child is “an everyday domestic event” that should not have to be publicly defended.53 He speaks 
of a second “respectable” couple who abused their five-year-old daughter equally horribly: 
“They beat her, thrashed her, kicked her for no reason till her body was one bruise. Then, they 
went to greater refinements of cruelty—shut her up all night in the cold and frost in a privy . . . 
they smeared her face and made her eat that excrement.”54 And he speaks of a military general 
“of aristocratic connections,” an “exceptional” man who, on finding that an eight-year-old serf 
boy “threw a stone in play and hurt the paw of the general’s favorite hound,” undertook to punish 
the boy.55 The boy was “stripped naked,” told to run, and then the general set “the whole pack of 
hounds on the child.”56 They tore him to pieces.57 
Note that like Kant, Karamazov here focuses exclusively on social antagonism. The parents’ 
desire to abuse their children comes into conflict with the rights their children have to safety and 
security. The general’s desire to seek vengeance for his injured pet comes into conflict with the 
serf boy’s right to life. These are perhaps grotesque and extreme examples of social antagonism, 
but the heart of the problem in each case is that the individual human being has very distinct 
wishes, and is unwilling to give those wishes up for the benefit of another human being.  
Karamazov also, like Kant, can conceive of the possibility that suffering will contribute to 
the creation of an ideal human race, or an ideal human paradise. 58 He asserts that “all the 
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 religions of the world are built on this longing, and I am a believer.”59 However, Karamazov 
challenges the idea that this makes human suffering ultimately worthwhile.60  
          
I understand, of course, what an upheaval of the universe it will be, when everything in 
heaven and earth blends in one hymn of praise and everything that lives and has lived 
cries aloud: “Thou art just, O Lord, for Thy ways are revealed.” When the mother 
embraces the fiend who threw her child to the dogs, and all three cry aloud with tears, 
“Thou art just, O Lord!” then, of course, the crown of knowledge will be reached and all 
will be made clear. But what pulls me up here is that I can’t accept that harmony. . . . 
Perhaps it really may happen that if I live to that moment, or rise to see it, I too, perhaps, 
may cry aloud with the rest, looking at the mother embracing the child’s torturer, “Thou 
art just, O Lord!” but I don’t want to cry aloud then. While there is still time, I hasten to 
protect myself and so I renounce the higher harmony altogether. It’s not worth the tears 
of that one tortured child who beat itself on the breast with its little fist and prayed in its 
stinking outhouse, with its unexpiated tears to “dear, kind God”! . . . I want to forgive. I 
want to embrace. I don’t want more suffering. And if the sufferings of children go to 
swell the sum of sufferings which was necessary to pay for truth, then I protest that the 
truth is not worth such a price.61 
 
Given the choice, says Karamazov, between the sufferings of humanity contributing to a greater 
project or the sufferings of humanity remaining meaningless and unavenged, “I would rather 
remain with my unavenged suffering and my unsatisfied indignation, even if I were wrong.”62 
For Karamazov, the suffering of humanity is not worth any future benefit it might bring. 
What is particularly striking about this passage is that Karamazov does not outright reject the 
idea of the worth of social antagonism; rather, he affirms it. Karamazov equates the idea of the 
worth of social antagonism with belief in God, and he says, “it’s not God that I don’t accept . . . 
only I most respectfully return Him the ticket.” 63  Karamazov does not deny that social 
antagonism can lead to human benefit, but he does choose to not to partake in that benefit, and he 
makes this choice because the benefit is not worth the price.64 Karamazov avows the existence of 
a Kantian type of system, but at the same time he rejects its worth. 
It is important to note here that Dostoevsky himself does not necessarily share Karamazov’s 
viewpoint. In his book Dostoevsky, Nicholas Berdyaev argues that while Dostoevsky rejects the 
idea of evil somehow benefiting humanity, he also affirms the importance of human suffering. In 
Bredyaev’s own words, “the theory that evil is only a moment in the evolution of good cannot be 
imputed to [Dostoevsky]; this evolutionary optimism professed by so many theosophists is 
entirely opposed to his spirit. He was no evolutionist: evil for him was evil, to be burned in the 
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 fires of hell, and that is where he cast it.” 65  At the same time, Bredyaev holds that for 
Dostoevsky, “suffering raises man to his highest level,” and that “to climb from evil to a spiritual 
level one must denounce the evil in oneself and suffer terribly.”66 
Whether or not Dostoevsky himself would embrace Karamazov’s rejection of the benefit of 
social antagonism, within a Kantian framework, this rejection has a special significance. For 
Kant, the ultimate benefit of social antagonism is the perfect development of the human 
capacities; it is the perfect actualization of the human being.67 To deny the worth of the ultimate 
outcome of social antagonism is to deny the worth of the human being in her highest form. 
Karamazov’s rejection of the ultimate benefit of social antagonism constitutes a rejection of the 
human being, and not just any human being, but the best possible human being. Insofar as 
Karamazov himself is a human being, and is a part of the process of the development of the 
human being to her perfection, Karamazov’s rejection also constitutes a rejection of himself, and 
of the contribution that his existence and development make to a valuable end. 
This self-rejection proves to be incredibly damaging. To be a human being is to be a rational 
animal. What this means will only be completely realized once the rational capacities of the 
human being are completely realized. This complete realization of the human rational capacity is 
the ultimate end of the human being, the end to which all social antagonism leads. By rejecting 
this end, Karamazov also rejects the complete realization of the human being within the world. 
He does not reject the existence of the human being, but he does reject what for Kant is the very 
meaning of the human being, and what ultimately constitutes the human being as the being that it 
is. Karamazov exists in a state of limbo. He will not outright deny the human race, but if he can 
at all help it, he will also not allow the race to fully realize itself within the world. This is an 
irrational move, an absurd move, an insane move. Quite literally. By the end of the text 
Karamazov hallucinates a conversation with the devil,68 and falls into a state of utter delirium;69 
Karamazov goes mad.       
Accepting Kant’s idea of social antagonism as contributing to the ultimate end of humanity is 
unlikely to lead to this kind of madness. One of the benefits of Kant’s idea is that it can serve as 
fortification against the evils human beings suffer as a result of social antagonism, and as an 
inspiration to live through these evils. Kant’s idea can give humanity hope that all of this 
suffering will, in the end, mean something incredible. It creates the possibility that suffering can 
be transformed into a positive phenomenon. It opens up a space in which human beings can 
move forward, can develop both themselves and their race. Karamazov’s argument opens up 
none of these possibilities. Where Kant’s idea leads to the flourishing of humanity, Karamazov’s 
argument leads to nothing but madness. It leaves humanity in a terrible situation with no possible 
way out. This makes Karamazov’s argument not only logically contradictory, but also 
psychologically destructive. 
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 Despite this destructive tendency, Karamazov’s argument still poses a valuable critique of 
Kant’s idea, and it does so for two reasons. First, it highlights how removed Kant’s argument is 
from the everyday life of most human beings. Kant’s argument is beautifully structured, but it is 
also highly theoretical—alluding to ideals instead of practical reality—and it therefore risks 
becoming disconnected from the material consequences of the idea with which it deals. In 
theory, it may make perfect sense to prize the development of humanity over the suffering of the 
individual. In reality, the price the suffering individual pays could be too high. D. H. Lawrence 
points out that Karamazov’s critique is “based on the experience of two thousand years . . . and 
on a profound insight into the nature of mankind.”70 Indeed, Nathan Rosen reports that the 
events Karamazov bases his argument on are “actual newspaper reports on Turkish atrocities and 
horror stories of every kind.”71 Kant may have worked out something sound, and rational, and 
noble. But the question Karamazov’s argument asks is, can the sound, the rational, and the noble 
hold up against the dark realities of human life?  
The second critique strikes at a slightly deeper level. Albert Camus argues that Karamazov’s 
primary plea “is for justice, which he ranks above divinity.”72 “God,” writes Camus, “is put on 
trial. If evil is essential to divine creation, then creation is unacceptable. Ivan will no longer have 
recourse to this mysterious God, but to a higher principle—namely, justice. He launches the 
essential undertaking of rebellion, which is that of replacing the reign of grace by the reign of 
justice.”73 Camus’ analysis reveals that Karamazov’s project is ultimately a moral one: he is 
seeking justice, not necessarily for humanity as a whole, but for the individuals who have 
suffered for the sake of some higher calling, and who would be swept aside in a theory like 
Kant’s. By rejecting the idea that a higher good can justify human suffering, Karamazov is 
appealing to something outside of Kant’s framework, to a morality that transcends rationality. 
Kant’s theory might be rational, but perhaps the real question is, is it moral? Karamazov’s 
project might well be contradictory, and it might lead to insanity, but it is done for the sake of a 
justice that Kant overlooks. 
Kant gives his readers something Karamazov never will—rationality, sanity, and perhaps 
even hope. His argument offers the possibility for human suffering to mean something, to 
contribute to a better humanity that will ultimately make any amount of pain worthwhile. Taken 
within a Kantian context, Karamazov’s argument offers nothing but contradiction. He is a human 
being who seeks to prevent the perfection of the human race, and so undermine his own reason 
for existence. The story he tells us offers no hope for the future, just the promise of suffering, 
and the call to rebellion. Follow Karamazov, and you might well go insane. Yet Karamazov’s 
argument also points to a moral weakness in Kant’s theory. Karamazov calls his readers to 
examine the injustice done to individuals, and to reject a rationality that ignores its own material 
cost. He asks us: is human perfection really worth the cost? Or is it better to be mad? 
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